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Patronage politics as a driver of economic regionalisation: The Indonesian oil palm sector 
and transboundary haze 
By HELENA VARKKEY 
Abstract 
Recent evidence has linked illegal peat and forest fires in Indonesia to commercial oil palm 
plantations. Fire is the most cost-efficient way to clear land for planting, but these fires release 
smoke causing transboundary haze pollution. The countries worst affected by the haze are 
neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysian and Singaporean investors control more than 
two-thirds of the Indonesian oil palm plantation sector and they have been implicated in the fires 
alongside local plantations. Using information obtained from interviews with individuals linked 
to the sector, this paper aims to explain why these companies continue to burn despite the dire 
consequences of the haze. It identifies patronage politics as a common business culture in 
Southeast Asia, and argues that because these Malaysian and Singaporean investors are already 
familiar with patronage practices at home, they have easily inserted themselves into existing 
patronage networks in Indonesia. Hence, these companies enjoy the protection of their 
Indonesian patrons during their operations. Furthermore, in a business atmosphere defined by 
patronage politics, clients are largely motivated by material gain. This explains why Malaysian 
and Singaporean investors continue to clear land by fire in the interests of cost-efficiency, 
despite their home countries suffering the worst effects of haze. 
Keywords: economic regionalisation, Indonesia, oil palm, patronage politics, Southeast Asia, 
transboundary haze 
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Patronage Politics as a Driver of Economic Regionalization in Indonesia: 
The Oil Palm Sector and Haze 
Introduction 
The Indonesian archipelago consists of 18,110 islands with a total land area of 1,890,754 
hectares, with tropical climate and high rainfall. These geographical conditions make Indonesia a 
highly biologically affluent country, with huge agricultural potential (Widianarko, 2009: 2). 
Indonesia’s favorable climate and good soil conditions make it especially suitable for the 
cultivation of oil palm (Samsul et al., 2007: 1, Butler et al., 2009: 68). These conditions support 
the growth of high yield oil palms (3,511 kilolitres per hectare) which could be harvested 
throughout the year, resulting in a palm oil production process that is highly efficient (Suharto, 
2011: 19). 
Figure 1: Area harvested of oil palm fruit in Indonesia, 1961-2009 
Interest in oil palm cultivation in Indonesia began during the colonial times, when Dutch settlers 
planted the first four African palms in Buitenzorg Botanical Garden (now Bogor) (Wahid et al., 
2004: 3). The lucrative economic returns from palm oil in neighbouring Malaysia (which was an 
early mover for palm oil) encouraged Indonesia to expand its oil palm cultivation (Basiron, 
2007: 291). Indonesia started rapidly opening up oil palm plantations in Sumatra and Kalimantan 
in the 1980s (see Figure 1) (Indonesian Government, 1998), fuelled by a specific policy goal that 
was formulated by the Indonesian government to overthrow Malaysia as the world’s largest palm 
oil producer (Van Gelder, 2004: 19). Expansion was pursued largely through the privatization of 
previously state-run estates, particularly through the ‘Estate Transmigration Programme’ and the 
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‘Plantation Revitalization Programme’ known collectively by its Indonesian acronym PIR-Trans 
(McCarthy and Cramb, 2009: 114-117, McCarthy, 2010: 822-844, Casson, 2002: 221-242).  
Figure 2: CPO production by country 
Consequently in Indonesia, large commercial plantations began to shift from logging and pulp 
and paper production to oil palm production (McCarthy and Zen, 2010: 155-156). These 
included major conglomerates like Bakrie Sumatra Plantations (BSP), Duta Palma, Astra Agro, 
Makin Group, and Musim Mas (Van Gelder, 2004: 32). By 2008, Indonesia overtook Malaysia 
to become the world’s biggest producer of palm oil (McCarthy, 2010: 822-844, Jarvis et al., 
2010-12, Reuters, 2011, World Growth, 2011-13, Bernama, 2010), producing over 25 million 
tonnes of palm oil annually (Interviewee I48, 2011) and contributing to about 51% of world 
production (see Figure 2) (Di, 2011: 3). In terms of revenue, the sector contributes around 5% of 
Indonesia’s GDP annually (see Figure 3) (iStockAnalyst, 2009). 
Figure 3: Breakdown of Indonesia’s 2010 GDP by sector 
However, this rapid expansion of the oil palm plantation sector in Indonesia was not entirely 
homegrown. To further encourage growth of the sector, Indonesia opened up its oil palm sector 
to foreign investors during the early 1990s (McCarthy and Cramb, 2009: 114-117). A trend 
quickly developed within the sector where regional investors, Malaysian and Singaporean 
investors in particular, overwhelmingly outnumbered investors from other countries (see Figure 
4) (Marinova, 1999: 77). Currently Malaysian and Singaporean investments hold more than two-
thirds of Indonesia’s total oil palm plantation area (WALHI et al., 2009: 228-243).  
Figure 4: Country of origin of investors in the oil palm sector in Indonesia, 2004 
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A better understanding of investment trends and motivations within the Indonesian oil palm 
plantation sector is pertinent in the face of recent increased evidence of the link between illegal 
peat and forest fires and commercial oil palm plantations (Sawit Watch, 2007: 1, WALHI et al., 
2009). Hotspot maps superimposed over concession maps suggest that many large plantation 
companies were systematically setting fire to both peatlands and other areas for land clearing 
(Chiew [M15], 2010, Ramakrishna [M20], 2010, Arif [I41], 2011). Based on satellite data, it is 
estimated that 80% of the fires were set by plantation companies or their sub-contractors for land 
clearing purposes, while the remaining 20% were set by slash-and-burn farmers (Tan [S7], 2010, 
Rukmantara [I45], 2011). Such open burning is the most cost-effective method to clear land to 
flatten the stumps left over from logging and old crops, as well as to clear smaller vegetation  in 
preparation for planting (Interviewee I49, 2011: 13-17, Dauvergne, 1998).  
These fires release smoke, which, when in sufficient amounts to travel across boundaries, result 
in what is known as transboundary haze pollution (Tan et al., 2009: 423). The almost annual 
haze affects the health of some 75 million people and the economies of six Southeast Asian 
nations; with the worst affected being Malaysia and Singapore (Mayer, 2006: 202-203). With 
Malaysian and Singaporean plantation investors implicated in causing fires alongside local 
Indonesian plantation firms, the involvement of Malaysian and Singaporean firms in this sector, 
especially since their practices directly victimize their home countries, become of great concern. 
Therefore, with a close analysis of foreign investment trends and business practices in the sector, 
this paper aims to contribute to the larger understanding on why these commercial plantations in 
Indonesia have been able to carry out these illegal burning activities with such impunity. Such an 
understanding is pertinent in finding solutions to mitigate the recurring problem of transboundary 
haze in the region.  
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Conceptual framework  
This paper uses the concept of economic regionalization to explain the trend of Malaysian and 
Singaporean plantation investors in Indonesia. Economic regionalization refers to ‘often 
undirected processes of integration that arise from markets, private trade and investment flows, 
and the policies and decisions of companies’ (Breslin and Higgott, 2003: 177). It involves 
autonomous economic processes which lead to comparably higher levels of economic 
interdependence within a given geographical area. This includes the growth of intra-firm trade, 
the increasing numbers of international mergers and acquisitions, and the emergence of 
increasingly dense networks of strategic alliances between firms (Hurrell, 1995: 334). The 
concentration of Malaysian and Singaporean plantation interests in the neighbouring Indonesia is 
indicative of high levels of economic regionalization of the Southeast Asian oil palm plantation 
sector. 
In the Southeast Asian context, Sim (2006: 490-491) has noted two distinct drivers of economic 
regionalization: the role of the state as facilitator, and the role of cultural familiarity. The role of 
the state as facilitator for economic regionalization in Southeast Asia has been well explored in 
the literature (Beeson, 2004, Scott, 1972, Sim, 2006, Breslin and Higgott, 2003, Pempel, 2005). 
The importance of facilitation by home (Malaysia or Singapore) and host (Indonesia) states in 
the economic regionalization of the Southeast Asian oil palm plantation sector has also been 
previously discussed elsewhere (Rajenthran, 2002, McCarthy and Cramb, 2009, Marinova, 1999, 
Casson, 2002, Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2011). 
However, knowledge on the second driver of economic regionalization, the role of cultural 
familiarity, in the economic regionalization of the Southeast Asian oil palm plantation sector is 
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far less clear. It has been established in the literature that a firm’s initial entry is usually to a 
foreign market that is closer in terms of culture, including factors like language, education, 
business practices, and industrial development (Sim, 2006: 490). Familiarity with cultures within 
the same region lowers transaction costs associated with doing business. Similar cultural 
attitudes and heritage further fosters the development of trust and cooperative behaviour between 
locals and foreign investors (Terjesen and Elam, 2009: 1105-1106). This paper identifies 
patronage politics as common business culture among Southeast Asian states, and argues that 
this has been an important driver of economic regionalization in the Southeast Asian oil palm 
plantation sector.  
Patronage politics can be defined as ‘a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving an 
instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic position (patron) uses his 
own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower 
status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including 
personal services, to the patron’ (Scott, 1972: 92). Patrons and clients are exclusively motivated 
by material gain (Kurer, 1996: 645-661). In this way, patronage politics can be seen as ‘a form of 
domination that is used by modern political and economic elites to channel resources for their 
own benefit’ (Gunes-Ayata, 1994: 17-26).  
While foreign firms that intend to enter into markets where patronage politics plays an important 
role will often attempt to engage in similar practices as well (Enderwick, 2005: 126, Hamilton-
Hart, 2005: 171), patronage networks are more easily built and managed across similar ethnic, 
cultural and linguistic boundaries (Terjesen and Elam, 2009: 1105-1106). This is because 
internationalizing businesses tend to acquire characteristics and strategies that reflect the cultural 
and institutional contexts in which they are established (Hamilton-Hart, 2005: 171). Indeed, 
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studies have shown that corporate firms that regionalize or internationalize often continue to 
display distinctive local features of their home country in their business dealings in the new host 
country (Doremus et al., 1999). Therefore, this paper argues that Malaysian and Singaporean 
plantation companies had an advantage over other foreign firms when investing in Indonesia, 
because of their cultural similarities with each other, especially in terms of the culture of 
patronage in business practices. Hence, this has been an important driver for regionalization in 
the Southeast Asian oil palm sector (Lawrence [I38], 2011, Anshari [I42], 2011).  
Therefore, this paper argues that because these Malaysian and Singaporean firms are already 
familiar with patronage practices at home, Malaysian and Singaporean plantation investors were 
able to easily insert themselves into patronage networks in Indonesia (Tarigan [I23], 2010), 
further spurring economic regionalization in the sector. Although the importance of the shared 
culture of patronage politics within the region as a possible driver for economic regionalization 
in the Southeast Asian oil palm plantation sector has been previously alluded to in the literature 
(Gilbert, 2009, Colfer, 2002), convergent evidence on the effect of shared patronage cultures on 
the regionalization of Malaysian and Singaporean plantation interests to Indonesia does not yet 
exist.  
Furthermore, while the literature has shown that patronage politics is a dominant characteristic of 
the societies in Southeast Asia (Enderwick, 2005: 117-127), very rarely has foreign investors 
been included in this analysis. Specifically, few, if any studies have examined what this paper 
calls the ‘regionalization’ of patronage politics. While traditional patronage politics has generally 
been characterized by highly affectionate ties based on kinship, village or neighbourhood bonds 
based on loyalty, obligation, honour, and non-material rewards, Dauvergne (1995) argued that 
the spread of market capitalism, which included the opening up of markets to foreign investment, 
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has caused modern patronage exchanges to became more monetized, no longer relying on long-
standing kinship bonds (Dauvergne, 1997: 75-76). This thesis adopts and extends Dauvergne’s 
concept in the context of Malaysian and Singaporean plantation firms in Indonesia. Since 
patronage relations were no longer based on long-term loyalty, these ‘newcomer’ firms from 
Malaysia and Singapore were able to also easily establish their own patronage relations with 
Indonesian elites. Therefore, culturally-similar Malaysian and Singaporean firms were not at a 
disadvantage for being foreign, and were able to insert themselves into these local patronage 
networks. Such social ties to key ‘others’ of high status or with valuable knowledge, money, and 
relationships can provide gains through knowledge and access to local markets, distribution 
systems, connections around local bureaucracy and business systems, as well as potential 
business partners, associates and financing (Terjesen and Elam, 2009: 1105-1106). 
Methodology 
This research paper aims to address these gaps in the literature by providing qualitative evidence 
from interviews conducted among 138 individuals that are closely linked to the Indonesian oil 
palm plantation sector. These included government officials, journalists, non-governmental 
organization (NGO) representatives, former plantation staff, and academicians in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore. These in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted over a 
period of six months in the year 2010, three months in 2011 and another three months in 2012, 
under approval of the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sydney. These 
interviews were conducted as part of a larger and still ongoing study of the effect of patronage 
politics on regional level transboundary haze mitigation efforts. 
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The interview method was especially appropriate for exploring this sensitive topic of patronage 
(Gill et al., 2008: 292) as it allows for easier expression of non-conformity (Stokes and Bergin, 
2006: 28). However, while some interviewees allowed me to use their real names for this 
research, some preferred to remain anonymous. Therefore, I devised a system to maintain 
uniformity in the classification of interview sources for this paper. To indicate the country or 
institution where the interview was conducted, the letters ‘I’ for Indonesia, ‘M’ for Malaysia, and 
‘S’ for Singapore is used, along with a number to indicate the order of which the interview was 
conducted. For example, an interviewee who allowed himself or herself to be named, who was 
the tenth to be interviewed in Singapore, would appear referenced as, ‘Ali [S10]’. An anonymous 
interviewee in Malaysia would be referenced as ‘Interviewee M5’. 
This paper uses the qualitative data obtained through these interviews firstly as evidence to 
establish the existence of the dense patronage networks that already exist between the major 
Indonesian oil palm plantation companies and the Indonesian government at the central and local 
level. It then continues to use evidence uncovered through interviews to demonstrate that 
Malaysian and Singaporean firms have also been able to cultivate these patronage networks 
among the same Indonesian political elite. This paper then discusses the implications of these 
networks the shaping of land policies, and law enforcement within in the Indonesian oil palm 
plantation sector, with specific reference to fires and haze.  
Patronage politics and Indonesian plantation firms 
A central feature of the Indonesian oil palm sector is the importance of patronage networks 
(Surya [I9] and Akbar [I10], 2010, Arif [I41], 2011, Syaf [I27], 2010, Rukmantara [I45], 2011), 
especially in terms of knowledge and access to local markets, distribution systems, connections 
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around local bureaucracy and business systems, as well as potential business partners and 
associates and financing (Terjesen and Elam, 2009: 1105-1106). This sector tends to be 
organized through personal and industry-based social networks and relationships (Sim, 2006: 
491). With the particularly long time frames of the sector (with a crop rotation of about 20 to 30 
years) firms often need to cultivate long term patronage relationships throughout this period 
(Surya [I9] and Akbar [I10], 2010).  
Therefore, it is common among the top tiers of Indonesian plantation firms to have ‘functional 
directors’ appointed to perform ‘extra-economic functions’ (Gomez, 2009: 10), and ‘advisors’ 
who are elected on a retainer basis. Indonesia adopts a two-tier management structure, 
comprising a board of directors and a board of commissioners. Officially, the former manages 
and represents the company and the latter supervises the directors (Rajenthran, 2002: 21). 
However, in reality, members of the board of commissioners (and sometimes also board of 
directors) are typically retired senior bureaucrats (mantan) who could act as intermediaries with 
the state and perform ‘advisory and brokerage functions’ on behalf of the company when needed 
(Surya [I9] and Akbar [I10], 2010, Syaf [I27], 2010, Arif [I41], 2011, Tarigan [I23], 2010, 
Anshari [I42], 2011). In other words, they are elected to the post by virtue of their connections. 
Indeed, for a former senior government or military official, holding such a post by virtue of their 
former position is usually the ‘ultimate goal’ after retirement, and often even while these 
officials are in office, they will be maintaining relationships with companies in the hopes of 
securing such a post after retirement (Rukmantara [I45], 2011, Syaf [I27], 2010, Syarif [I2], 
2010). As one interviewee observed, ‘why otherwise would they put former important 
government people, with little or no business expertise in the sector, in their management?’ (Arif 
[I41], 2011).  
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This is an important element in patronage politics (Johnston, 2005: 21), and especially common 
in the oil palm sector (Surya [I9] and Akbar [I10], 2010, Arif [I41], 2011, Syaf [I27], 2010, 
Rukmantara [I45], 2011). For example, one of the directors of the Indonesian plantation 
company, BSP is Bungaran Saragih, who formerly served as Minister of Agriculture under two 
Indonesian cabinets. A former Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Anton Apriyantono, is also a 
commissioner for BSP (Bakrie Brothers, 2010). Also, Chairman of the Bakrie and Brothers 
Group, parent company of BSP, is Aburizal Bakrie, who is also the Chairman of the strongest 
and most influential political party in Indonesia, Golkar (Golongan Karyawan or the Party of the 
Functional Groups) (Syarif [I2], 2010, Yansen [I43], 2011). Aburizal Bakrie is known for his 
close relationship with Ginandjar Kartasasmita, an Indonesian politician and former speaker of 
the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD, or Regional House of Representatives). He was 
also a former secretary general of the Indonesian President’s Economic and Financial Resilience 
Council (Eklof, 2002: 235). In the case of the Indonesian plantation company Duta Palma, a 30% 
ownership by the Indonesian military has meant that many prominent former military men have 
positions within the company (Gilbert, 2009: 2-3). For example, a director at Duta Palma is a 
staff of the Special Presidential Division of Social Communication, retired Major General Sardan 
Marbun (Arif [I41], 2011).  
Such appointments also occur at the local level, especially with the advent of decentralization in 
Indonesia. With decentralization, the role of local police chiefs (Interviewee M45 et al., 2012), 
local (district and regency) governments, administrators and politicians became increasingly 
important (Interviewee I49, 2011, Lawrence [I38], 2011). This paper therefore argues that 
decentralization processes have simply shifted some of the incentives and opportunities for 
patronage and corruption from the central to the sub-national level (Lee [S20], 2010), where 
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revenue-oriented local officials and elites take advantage of decentralization by establishing local 
fiefdoms fed by decentralized corruption (Widianarko, 2009: 1, Syarif and Wibisana, 2007: 31). 
Here, high-level local politicians can use their influence to collect kickbacks from private firms 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2008: 331). In these ways, decentralization impedes coordination (Samsul et 
al., 2007: 13) and exacerbates incentives for officials at different levels to ‘overgraze’ the 
common resource base, creating new networks of patronage. Indeed, a larger number of 
administrative or government tiers is correlated with higher corruption and patronage (Fan et al., 
2009: 14-32). With poor supervision of local politicians and bureaucrats especially after 
decentralization, these officials cease to be beholden to abstract rules and regulations. Rather, 
their actions are guided by bargaining and deals between implementers, other state officials, and 
strongmen outside the state (Kurer, 1996: 645-661). This situation was acknowledged by an 
Indonesian official at a national forum for investors and local officials, who admitted that ‘doing 
business out of Jakarta required a firm and committed relationship with the Bupatis (head of 
regencies)’ (Lawrence [I38], 2011).  
Indeed, an interviewee from a major plantation company described these local strongmen ‘like 
kings, who can make your life miserable if you do not have a good relationship with them’ 
(Interviewee M45 et al., 2012). It has been documented that commercial interests which 
previously only cultivated patronage relationships with central government officials were now 
forging patronage networks with local level leaders and officials as well (Lew [M6] and 
Interviewee M7, 2010, Tan, 2004). Plantation companies began to elect as part of their staff local 
strongmen, their relatives (Surya [I9] and Akbar [I10], 2010, Wibisino [I44], 2011), retired three- 
or four-star Generals, police chiefs or relevant ministry staff. These individuals would be hired as 
managers, special ‘community relations officers’ (Hubungan Masyarakat or HuMas) (Peters 
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[I1], 2010) or ‘government relations officers’ (Rowland [I39], 2011) to cultivate healthy 
patronage links at the local level (Peters [I1], 2010, Rukmantara [I45], 2011, Wibisino [I44], 
2011). For example, an interviewee who has many years experience working in the natural 
resources sectors in Papua, Indonesia professed that he was in high demand among companies 
because of his close personal friendships to ministers and Bupatis (Rolland [I50], 2011).  
The ‘regionalization’ of patronage politics 
By virtue of being local, these local firms often also have ‘home court advantages’ in terms of 
knowledge of laws and regulations and relationships with local players including customers, 
governments, and other businesses. To compete in these markets, foreign firms must possess and 
leverage information-based tangibles (Terjesen and Elam, 2009: 1105-1106) like knowledge of 
local business norms and practices. This paper argues that these Malaysian and Singaporean 
firms, familiar with the function of patronage networks at home and possessing cultural 
similarities with the Indonesian host state, understood the necessity of these connections (Ghani 
[S6], 2010, Syarif [I2], 2010, Tarigan [I23], 2010, Wiryono [I40], 2011, Anshari [I42], 2011, 
Interviewee I49, 2011) and had no qualms about adopting this patronage culture themselves.  
Major Malaysian investors in the Indonesian oil palm plantation industry include: Sime Darby, 
Tabung Haji Plantations (THP), Kuala Lumpur Kepong (KLK), Genting Plantations, and IOI 
Corporation (IOI). Sime Darby and THP are prominent Malaysian government-linked companies 
(GLCs), while Genting Plantations, KLK and IOI are owned by powerful and well-connected 
Chinese-Malaysian tycoons. Four of these companies are in the top 50 list of largest companies 
in Malaysia; Sime Darby at 7
th
 place, Genting at 9
th
, KLK at 20
th
 and IOI at 50
th
 (Gomez, 
2009:375-377). All these companies are known to have close patronage relationships with their 
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governments back home. This familiarity with patronage relationships, as this paper argues, has 
been instrumental in their successful integration within the oil palm plantation sector in 
Indonesia.  
For example, Sime Darby cultivated a close relationship with the Malaysian government over the 
years as Sime Darby assisted the Malaysian government in their developmental goals, by 
supporting ‘national causes’ through the undertaking of economically risky but strategically 
attractive projects (Tay, 2003: 51-53). For instance, when the Sarawak Land Development Board 
(SLDB), the government agency that was put in charge of plantation development in Sarawak, 
was making substantial losses and carried major liabilities in 1987, Sime Darby stepped in to 
assist the state government by buying over the management of SLDB and all its plantation assets, 
including over 24,000 hectares of oil palm in 13 estates (McCarthy and Cramb, 2009: 113-119). 
This relationship has been said to render Sime Darby ‘almost untouchable’. For example, 
interviewees who were in close contact with Malaysian NGOs related a conversation they had 
with officials from the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia in reference to Sime Darby. 
These officials told them that ‘it is very difficult for us to discuss Sime Darby’s actions, because 
the government is so involved with them’. Another prominent Malaysian GLC operating in 
Indonesia is THP (Surya [I9] and Akbar [I10], 2010). A notable director is Dato’ Noordin bin 
Md Noor, who has been active in the Malaysian political scene since 1976, holding various 
important positions in the Malaysian ruling party’s United Malay National Organization youth 
wing (TH Plantations, 2010).  
Even the non-GLC Malaysian companies operating in Indonesia enjoy close connections with 
the Malaysian government. These companies are usually headed by elite Chinese Malaysians, 
who rose to prominence through sub-contracting of government contracts from powerful Malays 
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in an ‘Ali-Baba’ arrangement where the Malay ‘Ali’ receives the contract through connections, 
then subcontracts it to the Chinese ‘Baba’ (Naguib and Smucker, 2009: 100-110, Norhashim and 
Ab. Aziz, 2005:31-45). These Chinese Malaysians eventually built up their own connections 
themselves among the Malay elite, and built their companies into major Malaysian 
conglomerates with prominent Malay and Chinese directors. For example, on the board of KLK 
sits Tan Sri Dato’ Thong Yaw Hong, the former Secretary General of the Malaysian Treasury 
and later Chairman of the Employee Provident Fund (Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad, 2010). The 
EPF also holds a 12.2% stake in the company (UOB Kay Hian, 2011: 40). Another example is 
the board of IOI, which includes Datuk Hj Mohd Khalil B Dato’ Hj Mohd Noor (a Malay), 
formerly the Secretary of the government’s Foreign Investment Committee of Malaysia (IOI 
Group, 2011). Yet another example is the Board of Directors of Genting Plantations, which is 
populated by many Malay former military officers like retired Lt. Gen. Dato’ Haji Abdul Jamil 
bin Haji Ahmad; retired Gen. Tan Sri Mohd Zahidi bin Hj Zainuddin; and retired Lt. Gen. Dato’ 
Abdul Ghani bin Abdullah. Another director, Tan Sri Mohd Amin bin Osman was formerly the 
Director of the Malaysian Police Special Branch (Genting Plantations Berhad, 2010).  
Singapore’s home-grown Wilmar International is the largest palm oil producer in the world and 
an important player in the Indonesian oil palm plantation sector (Creagh and Chatterjee, 2010, 
Grant, 2008). On Wilmar’s board of directors sit Chua Phuay Hee, a former senior figure in the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore and Yeo Teng Yang who was also a senior officer at the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore and Ministry of Finance, as well as Ambassador of Singapore 
to the European Community. Other notable figures on Wilmar’s board are Leong Horn Kee and 
Kuok Khoon Ean. Leong served on the Singaporean Parliament for 22 years, was formerly a 
senior figure with the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Finance, and is 
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currently Singapore’s Non-resident Ambassador to Mexico. Kuok in turn served on various 
government-run statutory bodies like the Sentosa Development Corporation, The Singapore 
Trade Development Board, the Singapore Tourism Board, and the Singapore Management 
University (Wilmar, 2010). 
Two other major Singapore-listed plantation companies with significant land banks in Indonesia 
are Golden-Agri Resources (GAR) and Indo Agri. These companies are actually subsidiaries of 
Indonesian-owned conglomerates Sinar Mas and The Salim Group respectively. These 
conglomerates shifted some of their operations and funds to Singapore in the aftermath of the 
Asian Financial Crisis (Rahim, 2009: 167), taking advantage of Singapore’s removal of the 40% 
foreign ownership limit for investments in 1999 (Haggard and Low, 2002: 315). Such companies 
are a good reflection of the regionalization of the palm oil sector in Southeast Asia, where 
plantation companies cannot be easily identified with a specific national home base. These 
companies have appointed second-generation family members to lead these subsidiaries, 
alongside prominent local Singaporean directors (Rukmantara [I45], 2011, Carney and 
Dieleman, 2011: 116). Indo Agri’s Chairman is Edward Kee Kwong Foo, a veteran of the 
Singapore Administrative Service who served, among other positions, as Singaporean 
Ambassador to Indonesia during which he received Indonesia’s highest civilian honour, the 
Bintang Jasa Utama (First Class). On its board also sits Lim Hock San, a former senior official at 
the Port of Singapore Authority and the Civil Aviation Authority Singapore (Indo Food Agri 
Resources, 2010). And on GAR’s board sits Lew Syn Pau, who served as a member of the 
Singaporean Parliament for 13 years, as a representative of the ruling party (Golden Agri-
Resources Ltd, 2010).  
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Interviewees opined that because of this familiarity with the function of patronage networks back 
home, Malaysian and Singaporean firms were more likely to engage in patronage as compared to 
other foreign firms operating in the Indonesian oil palm plantation sector, due to institutional 
inertia from behaviour in their home countries (because these companies were more likely to 
have engaged in patronage behaviour in their home states too) (Rolland [I50], 2011, Interviewee 
I49, 2011). For example, one interviewee explained that there was a marked increase of 
patronage behaviour from the plantation PT Asiatic Persada when it was bought over by 
Singapore’s Wilmar from Cargill, an American company, three years ago (Interviewee I47, 
2011). Cultural similarities encouraged these Malaysian and Singaporean firms to also establish 
their own linkages with patrons by hiring or establishing relationships with prominent 
Indonesians (Surya [I9] and Akbar [I10], 2010, Wibisino [I44], 2011) to leverage these tangibles. 
These locals are then able to use their influence over politicians and the administration to ensure 
preferable outcomes for these foreign companies, in the same way that Indonesian companies do 
(Norhashim and Ab. Aziz, 2005: 31-45). 
For example, the Singapore-listed GAR  is known to have several important current and former 
government officials (Syarif [I2], 2010, Tarigan [I23], 2010) and other prominent individuals ‘on 
the payroll’ (Dieleman and Sachs, 2006: 528-530, Dieleman and Sachs, 2008b: 278-279, 
Dieleman, 2010: 489, Dieleman and Sachs, 2008a: 166-167, Pratono, 2009).  GAR employed 
Ambassador Cameron Hume (Keen, 2010), a former well-received United States ambassador to 
Indonesia as an advisor (Rukmantara [I45], 2011). Also, on the board of GAR’s subsidiaries 
include Rachmad Gobel, who enjoys direct access to the President as an advisor on the National 
Innovation Committee; Dr Susiyati B. Hirwan, a former Director General at the State Finance 
Department (SMART Agribusiness and Food, 2010); and also a former senior staff of the 
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Ministry of Agriculture (Tarigan [I23], 2010). Also, several NGOs that were interviewed told of 
the rumour that Agus Purnomo, the Indonesian Special Advisor to the Ministry of Environment 
and Head of the Secretariat of the National Climate Change (hence making him a central figure 
on conservation and sustainability issues in Indonesia) (Syarif [I2], 2010) is being employed on a 
retainer basis by GAR (Surya [I9] and Akbar [I10], 2010). Anthony Salim, who helms The Salim 
Group (the parent company for Singapore’s Indo Agri) also enjoys close relations with the ruling 
government, having also held the position as secretary general of the President’s Economic and 
Financial Resilience Council, before Aburizal Bakrie (Eklof, 2002: 235) as discussed above. 
Other examples are the Malaysian plantation firm Sime Darby, which as a matter of principle, 
seeks out eminent people in host countries to be a part of its board of directors. The rationale for 
this is that these eminent people can further vouch for more strategically important people on the 
ground that Sime Darby can have strategic alliances with (Haji Mat Zin, 1999:483-484). For 
example, Sime Darby hired as an advisor the former Environment Minister Emil Salim (no 
relation to The Salim Group), who famously promoted the idea that ‘nature is purely something 
to be exploited’ during his time in office (Jakarta Post, 1987). Sime Darby also recently 
appointed the powerful Governor of the Indonesian Central Bank, Arifin Siregar as a 
commissioner (Tarigan [I23], 2010).  
GAR has been known to be particularly active in recruiting instrumental individuals at the local 
level. For example, GAR has funded political campaigns of hopefuls and keep them on staff on a 
retainer basis once they have been elected to the DPRD (Syaf [I27], 2010). This creates the 
‘mutual hostage’ situation (Interviewee I49, 2011, Yansen [I43], 2011, Tarigan [I23], 2010) 
where there is a mutual indebtedness between the parties, a common criteria of patronage 
relations (Enderwick, 2005: 129). For example, GAR has under its employment three members 
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of the DPRD in Tanjung Jabung Barat in Jambi where GAR has substantial land holdings. 
Slamet Riyanto, a former senior staff at the Jambi provincial forestry and plantation office 
(Jakarta Post, 2006), was employed by GAR, and later was elected a member of the DPRD. A 
member of the Prosperity Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), Aziz Rahman, was also a 
staff at a GAR subsidiary and was given leave while serving as a member of the DPRD. 
Megawati Sihotang, a member of the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia) and DPRD representative, was also a staff of a GAR subsidiary (Syaf [I27], 2010).  
This arrangement has proven beneficial for Malaysian and Singaporean firms, as well as their 
host country Indonesia. In terms of the overall cost-benefit equation, even though patronage 
politics increases the cost of production for investors (since time and resources have to be spent 
in establishing and maintaining these relationships in order to get licenses or government permits 
to conduct investment) (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2011: 43-44, Al-Sadig, 2009: 267), other country 
characteristics in Indonesia such as cheap labour and large markets make up for these negative 
costs (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2011: 43-44). Furthermore, in the presence of rigid regulation and an 
inefficient bureaucracy such as in Indonesia, patronage politics may actually increase 
bureaucratic efficiency by speeding up the process of decision-making (Rose-Ackerman, 2008: 
328-330, Al-Sadig, 2009: 269), and may in turn, indirectly encourage incoming investment and 
economic growth in Indonesia (Al-Sadig, 2009: 269, Richardson, 2010: 51), especially from 
neighbouring countries.  
Discussion: Patronage politics as a driver of haze 
Therefore, across the board in the Indonesian oil palm plantation sector, local, Malaysian and 
Singaporean plantation companies have individuals who have the ability to meet easily with 
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ministries, Bupatis and governors to maintain patronage-type relationships (Surya [I9] and Akbar 
[I10], 2010, Syaf [I27], 2010, Arif [I41], 2011). Individuals are expected to appeal to the 
administration on the company’s behalf should any problems arise (Arif [I41], 2011), and help to 
quietly ‘settle’ any disputes, including through informal influence with the local and central 
government (Interviewee M28, 2010, Arif [I41], 2011). Once the political connections were 
made, these companies faced few constraints from the local and central state framework 
(Johnston, 2005: 46). For example, when Rimbunan Hijau, a Malaysian forestry and oil palm 
company operating in Papua faced administrative troubles for clearing land outside their 
concessions, the company requested their staff Daniel Rolland to meet the local ministry to get 
all required documentation, which he was able to obtain, by virtue of his connections and native 
Papuan kinship bonds (Rolland [I50], 2011). As a result, there is an extraordinary amount of 
support for oil palm expansion from higher-level local officials, largely due to the patronage 
links cultivated within the sector (Colfer, 2002: 314). Government agencies are thus ‘captured’ 
by industry interests (McCarthy and Zen, 2010: 155-171), ‘not by gaining control over the policy 
making process and perverting it to its private benefit per se, but rather by tying the state’s hands 
in ways that make it difficult for the state to effectively regulate business activity’ in the sector 
(Wederman, 2002: 57).  
Patronage influences in the sector are especially important in obtaining licenses and property 
rights for the opening of plantation land, one of the earliest stages involved in the process of 
establishing plantations. Influential actors in the sector are often able to obtain rights to 
environmentally sensitive land not normally released for conversion, like peatlands (Interviewee 
I49, 2011, Wibisino [I44], 2011). Indeed, one of the conditions for patronage politics to exist is 
that potential patrons must have access to instrumental, economic or political resources that can 
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be tapped for patronage purposes (Hicken, 2011: 290-306). These resources are consciously 
allocated by patrons to particular clients who would otherwise not have received these gains 
(Nesadurai, 2004: 149-150). This is an important criterion of patronage relations, where 
privileges to property rights and licenses differ from ‘free market’ exchange, i.e. differ from 
outcomes strictly following the law (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1995: 209-233).  
Despite its infertility for other crops, peatlands are quite suitable for the growth of oil palm when 
deeply drained (Tan et al., 2009: 423). Opening up peatlands for plantations is also attractive to 
concessionaires because of the valuable timber growing in these areas. Another reason peatlands 
are highly attractive to concessionaires is because peatlands are usually free from Native 
Customary Rights claims, as communities rarely settle there. Therefore, acquiring peatlands is a 
good way to avoid highly publicized conflicts with increasingly vocal indigenous and local 
communities, which usually involve high compensation costs. However, peatland, when dried in 
preparation for planting, is extremely fire-prone (Wibisino [I44], 2011). Burning peat releases 
thick, sooty smoke that result in haze pollution (Tan et al., 2009: 423).  
Figure 5: Peat and palm oil in Indonesia, 2008 
The sensitive nature and ecological importance of peatlands justified special legislation under 
Presidential Decree Keppres No. 32/1990 and Indonesian Government Regulation No. 26/2008 
restricting the planting of palm oil on peat more than three meters deep (Anshari [I42], 2011), 
but research has shown that, up to 25% of concessionaires, including local and foreign 
companies alike, deviate from this rule and plant on deep peat anyway (Silvius and Kaat, 2010: 
21). All these plantation lands and future plantations on peat are essentially ‘illegal’ because it 
contravenes national laws (Interviewee I49, 2011). As a result, of the existing seven million 
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hectares of palm oil concessions in Indonesia, approximately two million hectares, or 27% is 
located on peatlands (Silvius and Kaat, 2010: 13-23), and a further three million more have been 
licensed for conversion in the future (see Figure 5) (Suharto, 2010: 8). Furthermore, over 50% of 
new palm oil plantation areas are planned in peatland areas (Greenpeace, 2007: 33). This 
amounts to an annual expansion of 150,000 to 200,000 hectares per year (Silvius and Kaat, 2010: 
23).  
Many major plantation companies have been found to have obtained licenses for peatlands in 
Riau. For example, Indonesian companies Duta Mas, Astra Agro and Musim Mas were all found 
to have acquired land on peat. Duta Palma was found to hold five concessions on very deep 
strata of peat ranging from 3.5 meters to eight meters, with a total area of 55,000 hectares. 
Musim Mas also has a concession on deep peat in Riau, with an estimated area of 30,600 
hectares, in some areas over four meters deep. Astra Agro has two concessions on peatlands in 
Riau, with an estimated total area of 20,000 hectares. Foreign companies are no exception, like 
Singapore’s GAR and Wilmar and Malaysia’s KLK and THP. GAR has six concessions on 
peatlands in Riau, with an estimated total area of over 54,000 hectares. Wilmar has three 
concessions on peatlands in Riau, with an estimated total area of over 29,000 hectares 
(Greenpeace, 2007: 3-53). Indo Agri has a concession on peat in Riau, with an estimated total 
area of 8,500 hectares. 70% (19,432 hectares) of PT API’s (a subsidiary of KLK) land in Riau is 
on peatsoil (Saharjo et al., 2003: 3). And most of THP’s 150,000 hectares of allocated plantation 
land in Riau is on peatsoil as well (Interviewee M28, 2010). In the neighbouring province of 
Jambi, companies like BSP, Sime Darby, Makin Group and GAR also operate on peatlands 
(Munadar et al., 2010: 1). 
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Patronage relationships often also extend well beyond the licensing stage. A key criteria of 
patronage politics is the ongoing nature of the relationship, in contrast to one-off bribery 
(Hicken, 2011: 290-306). This is especially necessary with the Indonesian oil palm plantation 
sector. With oil palm, often plantation companies do not clear and plant the whole land parcel at 
once. They also constantly apply and receive approval for new land licenses in different areas. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, crop rotation occurs every 20 to 30 years. This means that, 
land clearing for new plantings or replacement plantings often occur continually over time, not 
just once during the land lease. As discussed above, many plantation companies have used fire as 
a cost-efficient way to clear land (Chiew [M15], 2010, Then [M14], 2010, Nesadurai [M36], 
2010), and these fires, especially when located on peatland, produce the smoke that cause 
transboundary haze. Therefore, long term patronage relationships have to be cultivated so that 
patron protection can be relied upon throughout this period of time (Surya [I9] and Akbar [I10], 
2010). Because of the long time frames of the sector and the continuous process of land clearing, 
it is important for companies to maintain ongoing patronage relationships to enable them to 
conduct unscrupulous land clearing with impunity (Surya [I9] and Akbar [I10], 2010, Syarif [I2], 
2010), far beyond just the licensing stage.  
Many Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean firms have been able to evade official 
investigation by the Indonesian government despite repeated indicators of open burning. For 
example, Indonesia’s Duta Palma is known to be one of the companies with the worst track 
records in terms of illegal burning practices (Interviewee I47, 2011), but has never officially 
been scrutinized. Greenpeace investigations in Riau have revealed evidence of serious breaches 
of Indonesian law on Duta Palma plantations, especially illegal, intentional and systematic land 
clearing using fire. Since January 2006 to 2007, fires have been detected several times inside 12 
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of Duta Palma concession areas. Planting of oil palm seeds often takes place immediately after 
burning, proving that the fires were deliberate (Greenpeace, 2007: 30-43). Similarly in West 
Kalimantan, the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) found evidence of burning on Duta Palma 
concessions in April 2009 (Laurance et al., 2010: 379, Gilbert, 2009: 2). According to the RAN 
report, ‘foreboding clouds of black smoke hang over Semunying Jaya (the village), reminding 
the villagers that the clearing continues. After the chainsaws and bulldozers, Duta Palma 
labourers pour diesel fuel over the felled forest and sets it ablaze, lighting fires that smoulder for 
days’ (Gilbert, 2009). Incidences of burning have been reported to various authorities by NGOs 
and village heads, but no legal action has resulted (Greenpeace, 2007: 2). As RAN argues, it is 
Duta Palma’s connections within the Indonesian military that allows Duta Palma to operate with 
such impunity (Gilbert, 2009: 30-43).  
Other similar cases were with plantations of Malaysian companies like THP and IOI. An 
interviewee from a Malaysian NGO, Global Environment Centre, explained that THP was 
known to have burned about 20,000 hectares of land in Sumatra in 1997, which was identified as 
being the main source of smoke travelling to Singapore that year (Interviewee M44, 2012: 2). 
More recently, following a report by Greenpeace who detected 234 hotspots on five of IOI’s 
concession between 2006 and 2007 (Greenpeace, 2007: 21), Milieudefensie, another NGO, 
found that newly opened plantations in West Kalimantan belonging to Malaysia’s IOI in 2009 
had a substantial increase in fire hotspots in newly cleared land (Milieudefensie, 2010a: 12). It 
was found that prior to the start of land clearing activity in preparation for planting in 2009, there 
were no hotspots in the concession areas, however several concentrations of hotspots occurred in 
newly cleared areas. As the Milieudefensie report notes ‘although the concentrated occurrence of 
fire hotspots in newly cleared plantation development areas alone does not represent hard 
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evidence that IOI subsidiaries practice intentional open burning, few alternative causes could be 
determined’ (Milieudefensie, 2010b: 18).  
As mentioned above, plantations situated on peat are essentially ‘illegal’ because it contravenes 
national laws (Interviewee I49, 2011). And commercial land clearing by use of fire has been 
illegal in Indonesia since 1997 (Interviewee I6, 2010, Joedawinata [I33] and Sartono [I34], 2010, 
Udiansyah [I15], 2010, Keraf [I35], 2010, Tarigan [I23], 2010, Rowland [I39], 2011). However, 
this cultivation of patronage relations by both local and Malaysian and Singaporean companies 
therefore make it easy for these well-connected clients to skirt, resist, or even ignore state 
policies (Dauvergne, 1995: 89-98). Because of this, powerful businessmen with good patronage 
ties have no reason to fear punishment, and the law will be disregarded and wrong-doing may 
become the norm (Kurer, 1996: 645-661). In this way, corrupt patronage politics foster a culture 
of impunity and make it difficult to punish individuals for corrupt behavior. This creates a circle 
which leaves little hope in breaking the pattern of poor implementation. In this way, some state 
agencies end up accommodating, assisting or even strengthening the practices that destroy 
natural resources (Dauvergne, 1995: 89-98). As they are very hard to suppress, and as they serve 
the interests of their network members, they continue to flourish (Lande, 1983: 438-450). As one 
interviewee expressed, ‘in such environments without the rule of law and with weak government 
institutions, the big and the powerful tend to have disproportionate influence’ (Moore [I5], 
2010). 
Some of these patrons have been implicated by Indonesian law. For example, former governors 
of North Sumatra and Riau have been jailed because they were exposed for having ‘unlawful 
connections’ (vested interests) with oil palm companies (Syarif [I2], 2010, Yansen [I43], 2011). 
Indonesia Corruption Watch has identified and are currently investigating several Bupatis in 
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West and Central Kalimantan that also have vested interests in plantations (Arif [I41], 2011). 
However, because patronage politics is so widespread that it is almost the norm (Dauvergne, 
1995: 89-98), these cases are the minority. Even with anti-corruption efforts that intensified after 
the fall of President Suharto, recent reports indicate new setbacks, with the police force, the 
Parliament and the attorney general’s office obstructing the work of the anti-corruption 
commission (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2011: 55). For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
annulled the regulation setting forth the creation of a joint investigating team to scrutinize 
complaints of patronage influence in the courts (Rajenthran, 2002: 50).  
Conclusion 
Therefore, through this close analysis of the business practices in the Indonesian oil palm 
plantation sector, several points become obvious. Firstly, because Malaysian and Singaporean 
firms are already familiar with patronage practices at home, Malaysian and Singaporean 
plantation investors were able to easily insert themselves into existing patronage networks in 
Indonesia (Tarigan [I23], 2010). This explains the intense economic regionalization of the 
Southeast Asian oil palm plantation sector, resulting in more than two-thirds of Indonesia’s total 
oil palm plantation area being held by Malaysian and Singaporean interests (WALHI et al., 2009: 
5).  
Secondly, because of the ease in which Malaysian and Singaporean companies have been able to 
integrate into the Indonesian business environment, there are no discernible differences between 
the practices on the ground of local plantations companies and those of Malaysian and 
Singaporean investors. Local, Malaysian and Singaporean investors have been known to skirt 
regulations concerning land licensing and open burning, often inferring that political connections 
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would protect them (Dauvergne, 1998: 13-17). This explains the recent evidence linking over 
80% of haze-causing fires to plantation companies or their sub-contractors (Tan [S7], 2010, 
Rukmantara [I45], 2011). The rampant practice of patronage politics in this sector has enabled 
these local, Malaysian and Singaporean companies to act with impunity, even in the face of open 
burning allegations by civil society. Indeed, an NGO coalition known as the Anti-Plantation 
Mafia notes that patronage networks have been especially higher than average in the Indonesian 
palm oil plantation sector compared to other sectors in Indonesia because it involves a high level 
of illegal activity like illegal licensing and land clearing (Arif [I41], 2011). Therefore, patronage 
networks are especially important in this sector to protect these commercial interests (Syarif [I2], 
2010, Arif [I41], 2011). 
Thirdly, in a sector characterised by patronage politics such as the Indonesian oil palm plantation 
sector, both patrons and clients are exclusively motivated by material gain (Kurer, 1996: 645-
661). This explains why, despite Malaysia and Singapore being the worst victims of the 
transboundary haze, Malaysian and Singaporean firms continue to conduct their operations in the 
same way as do the Indonesian plantation companies, which include using fire to clear land for 
planting, in the interests of cost-efficiency. Furthermore, since many of these Malaysian and 
Singaporean companies are GLCs or otherwise linked to powerful political elite back home as 
well, these political elites are also somewhat motivated by material gain, and not the interests of 
the society suffering from haze. Therefore, transboundary haze is a classic collective action or 
free-rider problem: what might be rational at the level of society makes less sense at the level of 
the individual, and creates disincentives for people to go along with changes in patronage 
systems that would benefit the majority. Patrons disregard the long-term interest and focus on 
helping their clients; anyone outside the favoured group can expect little from the government. 
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Hence, patrons are obligated to disregard the long-term interest of society for a haze-free 
atmosphere, focusing instead on helping their clients maximize profitability in the oil palm 
plantation sector (Larson and Soto, 2008: 218-226).  
This paper has thus shown how the culture of patronage politics has been instrumental not only 
in driving the economic regionalization of the Southeast Asian oil palm plantation sector, but can 
also be linked to another regional-level issue, that of transboundary haze. In conclusion, it can be 
argued that the regionalization of the Southeast Asian oil palm plantation sector has been 
essentially bad for the environment and society of the region in the sense that it has been the 
cause of exacerbating transboundary haze. Differences of attitudes between Southeast Asian 
firms and these other foreign firms have been noted by several interviewees (Interviewee I48, 
2012, Rolland [I50], 2012). As discussed above, while foreign firms that intend to enter into 
markets where patronage politics plays an important role will often attempt to engage in similar 
practices as well (Enderwick, 2005: 126, Hamilton-Hart, 2005: 171), these firms will usually 
continue to display distinctive local features of their home country in their business dealings in 
the new host country (Doremus et al., 1999). Hence, other foreign companies, like those from the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States that also operate in Indonesia, have generally not 
been able to fully integrate themselves into local patronage networks, a largely Asian 
characteristic (Enderwick, 2005: 129). Because of this, they do not have the liberty to act with 
impunity on the ground, and thus have only very rarely been linked to fire and other 
environmental misconducts in Indonesia (Interviewee I48, 2012, Rolland [I50], 2012). 
Therefore, it can be inferred that if there has not been such intense regionalization of the sector, 
there may not be such severe haze. In a situation where almost ‘everyone is burning and the 
whole system operates based on burning’ (Moore [I5], 2010), there is little hope to effectively 
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address transboundary haze unless the root cause of the system, which this paper identifies as 
patronage politics, is conclusively addressed.  
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Figure 1: Area harvested of oil palm fruit in Indonesia, 1961-2009 
 














































































Figure 2: CPO production by country 
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Figure 3: Breakdown of Indonesia’s 2010 GDP by sector 
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Figure 4: Country of origin of investors in the oil palm sector in Indonesia, 2004 
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Figure 5: Peat and palm oil in Indonesia, 2008 
Indonesia Hectares 
Land area 190,000,000 
Area consisting of peat 26,500,000 
Area of which is degrading 12,500,000 
Area licensed for conversion into oil palm 5,000,000 
Area converted to oil palm 2,000,000 
% of palm oil (present and future) on peat 27% 
 
Adapted from: Silvius and Kaat, 2010: 16, Kaat and Silvius, 2011: 5, Suharto, 2010: 8 
 
 
 
